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INTRODUCTION 
From 2010 through 2014, the Supreme Court issued thirteen class 
action decisions.1 This unprecedented flurry started with Shady Grove 
* Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. I am grateful to Tom Arthur and Frank
Lowrey IV for comments on an earlier draft and to Lacey Elmore, Emory Law Class of 2016, for 
outstanding editorial and research assistance. I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this 
Symposium. 
1. I say “decisions” as opposed to “cases” to denote opinions in which the Court addressed
some aspect of class practice. In some cases, the Court addressed a substantive issue that just 
happened to arise in a class suit. For example, in Northwest Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (U.S. 
2014), the Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted state-law claims being asserted 
by a putative class. Moreover, although the Court granted certiorari in three cases to resolve an issue 
involving the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), the three were consolidated 
and resulted in one opinion. Chadbourne & Parke, LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014). 
Finally, though Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (U.S. 2014), was 
1
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Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.2 In 2011, the 
Court decided four more.3 It took a breather in 2012 but returned with 
five decisions in 2013.4 In 2014, it added three.5 Though the Court 
granted certiorari in one case for the 2015 Term, it has since dismissed 
the writ as improvidently granted.6 With the flow at least temporarily 
abated, it seems an opportune time to take stock of what these decisions 
might mean for federal class action practice. 
This group of decisions includes some good news for plaintiffs. 
Indeed, federal class practice survived two significant threats. First, in 
Shady Grove, by holding that Federal Rule 23 was on-point and valid 
under the Rules Enabling Act, the Court saved federal diversity class 
actions from ready evisceration by state law.7 Second, in Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), the Court spared federal 
securities class action practice by retaining the fraud-on-the market 
presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 cases.8 Contrary decisions in 
either case would have altered the legal landscape in stunning ways. 
And plaintiffs got other good news. In two decisions, the Court 
further facilitated securities fraud classes by holding that neither loss 
causation nor materiality must be demonstrated at the certification 
stage.9 In two others, it held that putative class members of uncertified 
classes cannot be bound by the representative’s stipulations about 
damages and, more importantly, remain free to re-litigate the question of 
class certification.10 In still two more cases, the Court interpreted federal 
jurisdictional grants narrowly, thereby allowing plaintiffs to litigate in 
brought not as a class action but as a “mass action,” it is included in this study because it raised an 
issue under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 
2. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131
S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. [hereinafter Halliburton I], 131 
S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011); and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011). 
4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013); Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (U.S. 2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 
2013); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013); and Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013). 
5. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. [hereinafter Halliburton II], 134 S. Ct. 2398
(U.S. 2014); Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. 1058; and Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736. 
6. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted
sub nom. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (U.S. 2014), cert. 
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 42 (U.S. 2014). 
7. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 144 and 147 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
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their preferred state forum.11 
Despite all this, the ledger is fuller on the defendants’ side.12 In four 
principal ways, recent case law does not augur well for plaintiffs. First, 
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court restricted the recovery of 
money in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.13 Second, in the same case, it increased 
the showing required for satisfaction of the commonality requirement 
under Rule 23(a)(2).14 
Third, there is a clear trend toward “front-loading” class litigation – 
that is, the need to do more and prove more in the early stages of the 
case. The Court has made clear that certification does not raise a 
question of pleading, but must be based upon “conclusive proof.” The 
fact that the evidence overlaps with the substantive merits of the dispute 
is irrelevant. Further, it is likely that expert testimony bearing on 
certification must be from witnesses qualified under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and after a full Daubert hearing.15 Moreover, in damages 
cases, the representative must prove that damages can be demonstrated 
on a class-wide basis.16 Front-loading increases the expense of gaining 
certification. Though both sides are affected, the burden may fall harder 
on plaintiffs’ counsel, who likely will be working on a contingent fee. 
The increased scope of litigation requires greater outlay by counsel to 
progress to the adjudication stage. 
Fourth, and most consequentially, the Court has countenanced the 
wholesale avoidance of dispute resolution by upholding contractual 
“waivers” of the right to seek group vindication of rights. Such 
provisions are commonly found in conjunction with arbitration clauses. 
Successful melding of arbitration clauses with class “waivers” means 
that many claims (particularly negative-value claims) will never be 
asserted.17 
This Article discusses each of the thirteen Supreme Court decisions 
with the goal of drawing at least tentative conclusions for their impact on 
federal class practice. The thirteen decisions may be placed into five 
groups. Only three of the cases directly involve the general interpretation 
11. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
12. Writing after the 2010 and 2011 decisions, Dean Kane concluded that the five cases
decided at that point did not evince any discernible jurisprudential theme. Mary Kay Kane, The 
Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing Into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1028 (2012). 
13. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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and application of Rule 23, while the other ten fall into four particular 
substantive areas. Reflecting these divisions, this Article proceeds in five 
parts. Part I discusses the three cases directly interpreting Rule 23. Part 
II addresses the three decisions involving securities classes brought 
under Rule 10b-5. Part III discusses the three decisions involving the 
Federal Arbitration Act. Part IV engages the two decisions addressing 
the non-party status of class members. And Part V concerns those 
decisions interpreting specialized grants of federal jurisdiction. 
I. INTERPRETING RULE 23 
This section addresses the three decisions that interpret Rule 23 
directly. Of course, these cases affect federal class actions generally, 
regardless of the substantive claims asserted. 
A. Shady Grove: Saving Diversity Class Actions 
In Shady Grove, an insurance company failed to make timely 
payments of benefits.18 Plaintiffs filed a federal class action, which 
invoked jurisdiction under the Class Actions Fairness Act (CAFA).19 
Class members asserted small statutory claims to recover interest on the 
overdue insurance benefits (the representative’s claim, for instance, was 
for $500).20 The New York Civil Practice Law forbade assertion of such 
claims in a class; they had to be pursued individually.21 Everyone agreed 
that the case satisfied the requirements for certification under Rule 23.22 
But can the federal courts permit a class action when state law would 
not? The Court said yes, but it was close. 
Five justices concluded that Rule 23 was on-point and clashed with 
state law and, thus, that the matter was governed by Hanna v. Plumer.23 
They went on to find the provision valid under the Rules Enabling Act 
(REA).24 The four dissenters concluded that Rule 23 did not “answer the 
18. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010).
19. Id.at 458.
20. Id. at 436.
21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 901(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015).
22. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397-406.
23. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). On this point, however, there was no majority. Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion applied Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), which requires only that a 
Rule “really regulate procedure” to be valid under the Rules Enabling Act. Because Rule 23 deals 
with aggregation of claims, it regulated procedure. Justice Stevens prescribed a more searching test 
for validity under the REA. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 393 at 416-23. Ultimately, however, he 
concluded that Rule 23 passed muster under his test. Thus, five justices upheld the Rule. See 
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 549-54 (3d ed. 2012). 
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question in dispute” and therefore rejected Hanna in favor of analysis 
under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.25 Shady Grove’s principal legacy, 
then, will be in vertical choice-of-law and not in class action practice. 
Nonetheless, two aspects of the case are relevant for the present purpose. 
First, the majority concluded that the issue of whether Rule 23 
“answer[ed] the question in dispute” was easy.26 Over a decade before, 
in his majority opinion in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp.,27 Justice Scalia opined that courts should interpret ambiguous 
federal directives narrowly to avoid different outcomes in federal and 
state court.28 In Shady Grove, he reiterated that position but concluded 
that Rule 23 was not ambiguous.29 The provision was susceptible of only 
one reading, and applied to the facts of the case.30 Justice Scalia wrote 
for himself and three others.31 On this point, however, Justice Stevens 
joined, so five justices agreed that Rule 23 governed the matter in 
dispute.32 
Second, it is important to give Shady Grove its due in preserving 
federal class practice. Had the case been decided the other way, two 
things would now be true. One, class practice could differ significantly 
from federal court to federal court (depending on state law). Two, state 
legislatures could prohibit class litigation not only in their courts but in 
federal tribunals as well, at least in diversity of citizenship cases. So, as 
Professor Mullenix reminds us, Shady Grove saved the federal diversity 
class action from “a near-death experience.”33 And it is of at least 
passing note that in Shady Grove the “conservative wing” of the Court, 
25. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The dissent in Shady Grove was authored by
Justice Ginsburg. Her Erie analysis led her to conclude that state law should govern even in the face 
of Rule 23. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 428-36. Justice Stevens, though sensitive to state interests in 
vertical choice of law, thought the dissenters contorted Rule 23 beyond recognition. Id. at 429 
(“Simply because a rule should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts 
may rewrite the rule.”). 
26. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 393.
27. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
28. Id. at 498.
29. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
30. Id. at 405-06.
31. Id. at 395-96.
32. Reasonable people may disagree, but the conclusion seems correct. Some Federal Rules
either apply to the issue before the court or they do not. Rule 23 in this case and Rule 4 in Hanna 
are examples (the latter at least as to methods for serving process). Other Rules are more 
problematic. Rule 59, for instance, allows the grant of a new trial but does not give reasons for 
doing so. With such a Rule, it is easier to imagine that the federal provision and state law might co-
exist. 
33. Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A New-Death Experience in a Shady Grove,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (2010). 
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in rebutting this existential threat, supported consumers (by allowing a 
class action that would not be permitted in state court) while the “liberal 
wing” supported big business’s assertion that it should be free from 
aggregate litigation in any court. The “conservative” wing supported 
federal preemption of state law,34 while the “liberal” wing championed 
application of state law. 
B. Wal-Mart: The Certification Bar 
In Wal-Mart, the lower courts approved a nationwide class of 
roughly 1,500,000 of the retail giant’s female employees.35 Class 
members asserted Title VII sex discrimination claims regarding pay and 
lack of promotion.36 Wal-Mart divides its 3,400 stores into 41 regions.37 
Store managers make pay and promotion decisions locally with limited 
central oversight.38 Plaintiffs argued that this local discretion was 
exercised disproportionately in favor of men and created a corporate 
culture of discrimination.39 The Ninth Circuit upheld class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and monetary relief (in the form of 
back pay).40 
The Supreme Court reversed on two grounds. Unanimously, the 
justices concluded that the monetary relief was improper in a Rule 
23(b)(2) class.41 Then, by a five-to-four margin, the Court held that the 
class failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).42 
Along the way, the Court threw in some hints (and maybe some 
holdings) on several procedural points. 
The limitation of remedies in Rule 23(b)(2) classes seems plainly 
34. The scope of that preemption under Hanna is narrower than some plaintiffs have
contended. For example, in Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. App’x 2 (4th Cir. 
2011), the class representative argued that satisfaction of Rule 23 meant that members did not have 
to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the relevant state law. The Fourth Circuit pointed 
out that Shady Grove involved an “explicit state-law prohibition” on aggregate litigation; it could 
discern no “basis on which to read it as excusing named class action plaintiffs from the threshold 
procedural requirements that they would face as individual litigants. To similar effect is DWFII 
Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d per curiam 469 
F.App’x 762 (11th Cir. 2011), in which the court held that Rule 23 did not render irrelevant 
Florida’s requirement that each claimant send a demand letter to defendant insurance companies.  
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (U.S. 2011).
36. Id. at 2546.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2548.
40. Id. at 2550.
41. Id. at 2557.
42. Id. at 2555.
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correct. Again, the Court was unanimous on the point, and I am not 
alone in thinking that the Ninth Circuit invited reversal by overreaching 
in approving the nationwide certification.43 Rule 23(b)(2), according to 
the Court, focuses on “indivisible relief.”44 There are important 
distinctions between mandatory classes under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), 
on the one hand, and opt-out classes under Rule 23(b)(3), on the other. 
The former do not require showings of predominant common questions 
or superiority of class litigation because those characteristics are 
assumed.45 Classes satisfying Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are cohesive either 
because individual litigation would be impossible or because the relief 
sought automatically inures to the benefit of all. In view of this inherent 
cohesiveness, due process does not require that class members be 
notified of their membership in the class or be given the right to opt out 
of the class.46 
In contrast, the Rule 23(b)(3) class bundles individual claims that 
are bound only by common questions.47 These class members are yoked 
not by legal relationships but merely by facts – they happened, for 
instance, to be on the same airplane or to use the same defective product. 
Because of the lack of relational cohesiveness, due process requires that 
classes predominantly asserting individual monetary claims provide the 
additional procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to opt 
43. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1
(impact of Wal-Mart and Concepcion cases could have been avoided had plaintiffs’ counsel not 
overreached). 
44. This conclusion, all justices agreed, is supported by the terms of the Rule, which require
that relief must be appropriate “respecting the class as a whole” and that the defendant “acted on 
grounds that apply generally to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The conclusion is also supported 
by history, because the provision was written to facilitate desegregation, where conduct could be 
remedied by a single class-wide order. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-58.  
45. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
46. In the wake of Wal-Mart, the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting issue in Beer v.
United States. There, an earlier case (Williams) was certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class on behalf of 
Article III judges. It argued that Congress’s failure to give cost-of-living adjustments to judges’ 
salaries violates the Compensation Clause because it results in a de facto reduction of judicial pay. 
The class sought a declaration of compensation due. Class members were not given notice or an 
opportunity to opt out. The judges lost on the merits. Beer is a separate class action asserting the 
same claim, and the question is whether class members were bound by the judgment in Williams. 
The answer is no. The Federal Circuit concluded that Williams, though brought under Rule 23(b)(2) 
was about the payment of money; it was essentially a claim for damages. Under Wal-Mart, due 
process requires notice in such a case. Because it was not given, the members were not bound. The 
court declined to address whether due process also required a right to opt out. Because the class 
members in Beer were not bound by Williams, the court was free to decide the merits. The court, 
sitting en banc, concluded that Congress had violated the Compensation Clause. Beer v. United 
States, 696 F.3d 1174, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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out.48 
The back pay claims in Wal-Mart, unlike those in some Rule 
23(b)(2) cases, did not flow naturally from the injunctive relief that was 
being sought. Indeed, injunctive relief would be meaningless for about 
half the class members because they no longer worked for Wal-Mart.49 
Moreover, because of different circumstances around the country, back 
pay would not be readily calculable; the claims were not liquidated and 
there was no ready formula for determining figures for the group.50 
Thus, back pay determinations would require myriad individual 
determinations, which, the Court concluded, would predominate over 
any common questions.51 
Here, the Court threw in one of its hints without an express holding: 
when individual determinations predominate, there is “the serious 
possibility” that due process requires that class members be given notice 
and the opportunity to opt out of the class.52 This “serious possibility” 
counseled the Court to interpret Rule 23(b)(2) narrowly and to reject 
certification.53 
Wal-Mart reins in practice under Rule 23(b)(2) to a degree. 
Through the years, some lower courts had allowed recovery of monetary 
relief in 23(b)(2) classes. They did so on three theories, two of which are 
rejected by Wal-Mart. First, some courts justified recovery of money 
that could be characterized as “equitable” relief, such as restitution.54 
But, as the Court pointed out in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) speaks only of 
“injunctive” and “declaratory” relief, and not of general “equitable” 
remedies.55 Second, some courts held that money could be recovered as 
long as the demand for equitable relief “predominates.”56 But, again, as 
the Court noted in Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) does not use that term; 
predominance is a factor only in Rule 23(b)(3) classes.57 
Only the third theory survives Wal-Mart. This permits recovery of 
money in a Rule 23(b)(2) class when the sum will “flow directly from 
liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the 
48. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
49. Id. at 2560.
50. Id. at 2557.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2559.
53. Id. at 2544.
54. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971).
55. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.
56. See, e.g., Bratcher v. Nat’l Standard Life Ins. Co. (In re Monumental Life Ins. Co.), 365
F.3d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2004). 
57. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
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injunctive or declaratory relief.”58 The archetypal example, which the 
Court cited in Wal-Mart, is Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.59 There, the 
injunction ordered the promotion of class members from one pay grade 
to another.60 Back pay flowed automatically from the fact that the class 
members were underemployed, which was remedied by the injunction 
for all class members in the same way – they were all bumped up a 
level.61 In this circumstance, the dollar figure for back pay is essentially 
liquidated: it consists of the difference between the pay grades 
multiplied by the time each was underemployed.62 After Wal-Mart, this 
theory remains viable, and lower courts seem to be hewing the line.63 
In Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit had tried to get around the need for 
individual hearings on back pay by prescribing a trial by formula: a 
subset of cases would be tried, and other class members’ back pay would 
be extrapolated from those results.64 The Court rejected this plan because 
it would deny Wal-Mart its right under Title VII to present defenses to 
individual claims.65 This, in turn, would raise the specter of abridging 
Wal-Mart’s substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.66 
58. Id. at 2560.
59. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
60. Id. at 415.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. An easy case is Cobell v. Salazar, in which the court upheld a monetary recovery by class
members in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit for accounting. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
The case involves claims by individual Native Americans for the Department of the Interior’s 
breach of duty to account for funds held in trust. Part of a settlement involved a $1,000 cash 
distribution per person. Under the unique facts (including congressional approval of the agreement), 
“the information produced from an historical accounting is not likely to be worth significantly more 
to some class members than to others, and thus the $1,000 settlement payment is properly viewed as 
non-individualized and does not run afoul of Wal-Mart.” Id. at 918. 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), involved 
a class of black securities brokers who alleged that their employer engaged in racial discrimination 
in selection of teams and distribution of accounts. The district court denied certification and the 
Seventh Circuit, on Rule 23(f) appeal, reversed. Although local managers for the brokerage firm had 
considerable discretion in setting up teams of brokers and distributing accounts, the case differed 
from Wal-Mart because they acted under two company-wide policies; these policies could account 
for disparate impact among employees. Thus, the court instructed the lower court to certify a Rule 
23(b)(2) class for determining common issues. Interestingly, however, the court did not permit 
recovery of money in the Rule 23(b)(2) class. Rather, if the class were to be successful, pecuniary 
relief – back pay and possibly compensatory or punitive damages – could be sought in “hundreds of 
separate suits.” Id. at 492. 
64. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
65. Id.
66. Usually, the concern under the Rules Enabling Act (REA) is whether application of a
Federal Rule will modify a substantive right under state law. In Wal-Mart, the concern was that trial 
by formula, as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit, would rob the defendant of a federal substantive 
right – the right under Title VII to present defenses to individual claims. 
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One upshot of Wal-Mart may be an increased number of motions to 
certify “hybrid” classes, which seek injunctive or declaratory relief 
under Rule 23(b)(2) and monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).67 
Though important, the holding on Rule 23(b)(2) pales beside the 
five-to-four portion of the case addressing the commonality requirement 
of Rule 23(a)(2). Because commonality is a prerequisite for all class 
actions, a higher hurdle on this score affects practice under all three 
types of classes under Rule 23(b). (Indeed, the holding on commonality 
doomed any effort to seek certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class in Wal-
Mart.) 
On its face, the holding – that the class claims failed to present any 
common question68 – is surprising. Commonality had never been much 
of a factor. It was all but impossible to find cases in which courts denied 
certification because of a failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).69 With Wal-
Mart, commonality becomes a more serious hurdle to certification. The 
majority confirmed that Rule 23(a)(2) requires that only a single 
question be common to the class members’ claims.70 According to the 
Justice Scalia voiced the general concern of the effect of class actions on substantive rights in Philip 
Morris USA Inc. v. Scott. There, he wrote as Circuit Justice of the Fifth Circuit and stayed a 
Louisiana intermediate appellate court ruling. The case, a class action brought on behalf of all 
smokers in Louisiana, was based upon common law fraud and alleged that the defendant tobacco 
companies had “distorted the entire body of public knowledge” about the addictive effect of 
nicotine. The state appellate court upheld a judgment on that theory of about $250,000,000, to be 
used to fund a 10-year smoking cessation program in Louisiana. 131 S. Ct. 1 (U.S. 2010). 
Justice Scalia focused on one asserted error. The state court recognized that an individual plaintiff 
attempting to recover damages would be required (as part of the fraud claim) to show reliance on a 
knowing misstatement by the defendant. In this class action (seeking payment into a fund that will 
benefit the class), however, the plaintiffs need make no such showing. This was because the trial 
court had found that the entire class relied upon the defendants’ distortion of “the entire body of 
public knowledge.” Moreover, defendants were not permitted to argue that particular plaintiffs did 
not rely on the alleged misrepresentations. As a result, individuals who could not recover if they 
sued alone will be permitted to recover because the litigation is structured as a class suit. 
Justice Scalia concluded: “The extent to which class treatment may constitutionally reduce the 
normal requirements of due process is an important question.” Id. at 4. Particularly because 
intrastate classes such as this cannot be removed to federal court under CAFA, he was concerned 
that “the constraints of the Due Process Clause will be the only federal protection.” Id. The Court 
ultimately denied certiorari in the case. 
67. See, e.g., Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2012)
(discussing need for hybrid class action after Wal-Mart). 
68. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
69. To the extent commonality got much of an airing in the case law, it was in Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires that common questions predominate over individual questions. In retrospect, 
however, perhaps we should not be surprised at the holding: the Court itself added the Rule 23(a)(2) 
issue to the case when it granted certiorari. Obviously, then, at least four justices wanted the issue 
on the table. 
70. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
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Ninth Circuit, the common question was whether the members were 
subject to a single set of policies (as opposed to independent 
discriminatory acts) that favored men over women.71 The Supreme Court 
shifted the focus of the inquiry. The key is not whether one can posit 
common questions, but whether the class litigation will generate 
common answers that will drive resolution of the case.72 In other words, 
the class members must suffer the same injury and not simply violation 
of the same law. Their claims “must depend upon a common 
contention,” such as bias on the part of the same supervisor.73 That 
common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-
wide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity 
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke.”74 In Wal-Mart, the majority concluded that there 
was no such “glue”75 – the litigation of no single issue would generate an 
answer for the entire class. Any discrimination was the result of 
thousands of individual judgment calls, which presented no 
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).76 
The Ninth Circuit had concluded that there was proof of a policy of 
company-wide discrimination, relying on the expert opinion of a 
sociologist.77 The lower courts in Wal-Mart concluded that expert 
testimony could be considered at certification without proof of 
admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and thus without a 
showing of reliability under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.78 In another of its hints, the Wal-Mart Court “doubt[ed] that this is 
so.”79 It thus suggested, but did not hold, that a full Daubert analysis was 
proper at the certification stage.80 
At any rate, the Court concluded, the sociologist’s opinions were 
worthless. Though the expert opined that Wal-Mart decision-makers 
were susceptible to reliance on gender stereotypes, he was unable to say 
how frequently such stereotypes actually affected employment 
71. Id. at 2549.
72. Id. at 2551.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2544.
76. Id. at 2552.
77. Id. at 2549.
78. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
79. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
80. Typical of the response to Wal-Mart on this issue is: “[i]f a district court has doubts about
whether an expert’s opinions may be critical for a class certification decision, the court should make 
an explicit Daubert ruling.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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decisions.81 Thus, the Court concluded, “we can safely disregard what he 
has to say.”82 Without proof of a policy of discrimination, there was no 
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). 
Plaintiffs were no more successful in relying on statistics and 
anecdotal evidence to show that individual decisions were made in a 
common way. The statistics may have showed differentials between 
genders, but did nothing to identify a “specific employment practice” 
that caused it.83 And the anecdotal evidence was too skimpy, constituting 
only one story per 12,500 class members and touching upon only 235 
stores.84 There was no commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) because there 
was “no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and 
promotion policy.”85 Plaintiffs thus failed in three ways – by sociological 
analysis, statistics, and anecdotal evidence – to show an employment 
practice that would tie together 1,500,000 claims.86 
Did Wal-Mart bring a sharp break with prior interpretation of Rule 
23(a)(2)? Some courts say that it did. For example, in M.D. ex rel. 
Stukenberg v. Perry,87 the Fifth Circuit rejected its earlier precedent that 
“the test for commonality is not demanding”88 and explained that Wal-
Mart “heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 
23(a)(2).”89 Thus, the court concluded, although finding that a single 
issue would affect a significant number of class members sufficed to 
show commonality before Wal-Mart, it is now insufficient. Resolution 
of some issue must be central to the validity of each claim.90 
81. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
82. Id. at 2554.
83. Id. at 2555-56.
84. Id. at 2556.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2555-57.
87. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Reyes v.
Julia Place Condo. Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 12-2043, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175111, at *19 n.1 
(E.D. La. Dec. 18 2014) (“Although plaintiffs claim that the bar is low for commonality, the case 
they cite to has been superseded by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.”); Baughman 
v. Roadrunner Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV-12-565-PHX-SMM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120983, at *8
(D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2014) (“The purpose of the rigorous commonality standard is to require that class 
members’ claims depend upon a common contention whose truth or falsity will resolve an issue that 
is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”). 
88. Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999).
89. Perry, 675 F.3d at 839.
90. Id. at 840. In Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp. (In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 678 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir 2012), the court characterized the Wal-Mart 
commonality requirement: “The . . . inquiry focuses not on whether common questions can be 
raised, but on whether a class action will generate common answers that are likely to drive 
resolution of the lawsuit.” But see Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Wal-Mart did not counsel finding lack of commonality regarding whether a reasonable consumer 
12
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In practice, though, it is not clear how much higher the hurdle may 
be. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that this new standard 
does not mean that differences in the harm suffered by class members 
will defeat commonality. The Wal-Mart requirement that class members 
“have suffered the same injury”91 is satisfied by showing a common 
instance of injurious conduct even though class members’ harm may 
vary dramatically.92 Wal-Mart clearly does not require that every 
question be common; rather, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied by “a single 
significant question of law or fact.”93 Indeed, to a surprising extent, 
some district courts (perhaps particularly in the Ninth Circuit) continue 
to rely upon pre-Wal-Mart authority in determining whether 
commonality is satisfied.94 
Though it is hard to quantify how Wal-Mart commonality might be 
more rigorous than earlier practice, the focus on generating common 
answers rather than asking common questions is new. It causes courts to 
engage the commonality requirement to a degree rarely encountered 
before. And, undeniably, this increased engagement results in rejection 
would be confused by defendant’s packaging). 
91. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
(1982)). 
92. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 810-11 (5th Cir. 2014). See also Serna v. Transp.
Workers Union of Am., No. 3:13-CV-2469-N, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181701, at *9 (N.D. Tex. 
Dec. 3, 2014) (“There is no requirement under the commonality prong that Plaintiffs establish the 
nonexistence of a conflict of interest.”). 
93. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
See also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 688 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While each of the certified ADC 
policies and practices may not affect every member of the proposed class and subclass in exactly the 
same way, they constitute shared grounds for all inmates in the proposed class and subclass.”); 
Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (“This does not, however, mean 
that every question of law or fact must be common to the class.”); DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 713 
F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Again, none of this is to suggest that a class can never be certified 
in this kind of case. Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that all questions be common to the class.”). 
94. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs, Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1175 (JG)(VVP),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180914, at *187 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014) (“Unlike the related inquiry into 
‘predominance’ posed by Rule 23(b)(3), commonality does not present plaintiffs with a particularly 
exacting standard.”); Cunningham v. Multnomah Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-01718-ST, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 180960, at *18 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 2014) (“The commonality standard is not strictly 
construed . . .”; fact that claims of each class member required individual inquiry into 
reasonableness of search did not defeat commonality of challenge to practices of county allegedly 
subjecting prisoners to unconstitutional searches); Stemple v. QC Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-01997-
BAS(WVG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125313, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (relying upon pre-
Wal-Mart authority that existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates satisfies 
Rule 23(a)(2)); In re Conagra Foods, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 537, 568 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing pre-Wal-
Mart authority for the proposition that “The commonality requirement is construed liberally, and the 
existence of some common legal and factual issues is sufficient.”). 
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of some certification motions for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).95 
Even if we conclude that Wal-Mart brings negligible change in the 
standards for Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(2), the case makes life more 
difficult for plaintiff classes by injecting various procedural hurdles, 
sometimes through passing remarks. We have already seen two: the 
suggestion (if not holding) that expert witnesses giving evidence 
regarding certification be vetted under Daubert96 and the “serious 
possibility” that due process require notices and opt-out for class 
members seeking individualized monetary recovery.97 There are others, 
and they raise the expense of litigating class certification. 
For starters, “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading 
standard.”98 Instead, plaintiff must “be prepared to prove that . . . in fact” 
the requirements are met.99 Quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest 
v. Falcon,100 the Court noted that there must be “rigorous analysis,”
“significant proof,” and “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 
23.”101 Plainly, then, certification is not to be decided on the pleadings; 
the parties must present and the court must consider evidence. 
In assessing this proof, one nagging question has been what the 
Court meant in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin102 when it implied that a 
court dealing with class certification should not decide facts that overlap 
with the underlying merits. In Falcon, the Court seemed to retrench, 
saying that consideration of the merits may be unavoidable when ruling 
on certification.103 Wal-Mart now makes this clear, calling the 
implication to the contrary in Eisen “purest dictum.”104 In Eisen, the 
issue was shifting the cost of notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class from the 
representative to the defendant.105 The district court in that case allocated 
the cost based upon its assessment of likelihood that the plaintiff would 
prevail on the merits.106 It was in that context (and not class certification) 
that the Court decried consideration of the merits. There is no need for 
such timidity in ruling on class certification, and Wal-Mart fosters front-
loading by envisioning that courts may consider and even rule upon 
95. See, e.g., DL, 713 F.3d at 126-28.
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
98. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (U.S. 2011).
99. Id. at 2551 (emphasis added).
100.  Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982). 
101.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2553, 2551. 
102.  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
103.  Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. at 155. 
104.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6. 
105.  Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. 
106.  Id. at 168. 
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factual issues that implicate the merits.107 
C. Comcast: Increased Procedural Front-Loading 
In Comcast, the Court revisited the topic of evidentiary proof at 
certification. This was an antitrust case in which the plaintiffs asserted 
that Comcast unlawfully “clustered” cable television providers in the 
Philadelphia area, thereby excluding entities that could provide 
competitive alternatives for cable service.108 The big questions at 
certification were whether antitrust injury and damages could be 
demonstrated on a class-wide basis.109 The plaintiffs asserted four 
theories of antitrust impact.110 The district court rejected three of these 
and permitted the case to proceed only on an “overbuilder” theory of 
impact.111 The expert testimony on damages, however, was aimed at 
showing damages under all four of the original theories of antitrust 
impact.112 It was not limited to the “overbuilder” theory.113 
Despite this disconnect between the substantive theory of impact 
and the damages model, the Third Circuit held that impact and damages 
were susceptible of class-wide proof.114 This holding supported 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because it ensured that common 
questions predominated.115 Moreover, the court refused to allow 
Comcast to challenge the damages model at certification because, it 
 107.  Of course, a court should not decide merits-based issues unrelated to certification. “Rule 
23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. 
Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to 
determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (U.S. 2013). 
108.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1428 (U.S. 2013). 
 109.  Plaintiffs need not prove the antitrust injury or damages themselves at certification. 
Rather, they must demonstrate that at trial they will be able to prove “to the satisfaction of a jury 
that ‘all putative class members suffered an injury and that the injury resulted from anti-competitive 
harms to the market as a whole.’” In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011). 
110.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430. 
111.  Id. at 1431. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit heard the 
matter under Rule 23(f) on January 11, 2011, but did not issue its decision until August 23, 2011. 
Undoubtedly, it waited for the decision in Wal-Mart, which issued on June 23, 2011. The Third 
Circuit majority opinion cited Wal-Mart in four footnotes, but based its holding largely on In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). Indeed, the majority says that in 
Wal-Mart, the “Supreme Court confirmed our interpretation of the Rule 23 inquiry [from Hydrogen 
Peroxide].” Behrend, 655 F.3d at 190 n.6.  
 115.  Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions predominate and that class litigation be 
superior to other means of resolving the dispute. 
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concluded, such arguments would improperly enmesh the court in 
consideration of the underlying merits.116 Finally, the expert evidence on 
damages was not vetted under Daubert. 
The Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether a district 
court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff 
class had introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to 
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide 
basis.”117 Comcast waived the Daubert issue by failing to object to the 
admission of plaintiffs’ expert testimony.118 Though this failure made it 
impossible for Comcast to argue that the testimony was not “admissible 
evidence,” Comcast remained free to argue that the evidence (when 
admitted) failed to show that damages could be shown on a class-wide 
basis.119 
The Court reversed certification.120 The five-member majority 
emphasized that its ruling was based upon Rule 23 and not on 
substantive antitrust law.121 It made three significant pronouncements. 
First, the need for “evidentiary proof” (as opposed to allegations) 
required in Wal-Mart applies to Rule 23(b) as well as to Rule 23(a).122 
Indeed, “[i]f anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even 
more demanding than Rule 23(a).”123 Second, because of the need for 
litigation of whether common questions predominated, the lower courts 
erred by not permitting Comcast to present evidence against the 
plaintiffs’ proffered damages model.124 And third, that model was fatally 
flawed because it was not limited to the “overbuilder” theory of antitrust 
impact.125 
None of these three conclusions is surprising after Wal-Mart. It 
would be unthinkable that one need proof to satisfy Rule 23(a) but not 
Rule 23(b). And once we decide to litigate questions overlapping with 
the merits, it would be unthinkable not to let the defendant litigate the 
issue. The holding on the third point also echoes Wal-Mart: even if we 
considered the plaintiffs’ expert evidence without a Daubert hearing, it 
116.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431. 
117.  Id. at 1435. 
118.  Id. at 1436. 
119.  Id. at 1431-32 n.4. 
120.  Id. at 1435. 
121.  “This case thus turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles; it 
provides no occasion for the dissent’s extended discussion . . . of substantive antitrust law.” Id. at 
1433. 
122.  Id. at 1432.  
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 1432-33. 
125.  Id. at 1433. 
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was worthless. In Wal-Mart, the expert could not say that the Wal-Mart 
“culture” he perceived had affected a single employment decision.126 In 
Comcast, the class-wide proof on damages did not match the theory of 
antitrust impact and, therefore, of liability.127 
With Wal-Mart and Comcast, the Court has done more than limit 
the availability of monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) classes and up the 
ante for showing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). It has interpreted 
Rule 23 to increase the scope of litigation at class certification. 
Certification is not decided on pleadings but requires presentation of 
evidence concerning satisfaction of Rule 23(a) and 23(b). The factual 
issues decided may overlap with the merits of the case. Expert testimony 
probably must satisfy Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
means that there must be litigation concerning whether the expert is 
qualified under Daubert. The plaintiffs must hew their substantive 
theory of liability with their expert evidence that damages may be 
proved en masse. And defendants must be permitted to challenge 
whether the class has satisfied any of these steps. 
This front-loading increases the expense of litigating class 
certification. More is on the table at an early stage than in prior practice. 
I call this “procedural front-loading” because it is imposed by Rule 23. 
We turn next to efforts by defendants to front-load certification litigation 
further by insisting that certain substantive matters be litigated at the 
certification stage. The examples come from securities fraud cases. 
II. REJECTION OF SUBSTANTIVE FRONT-LOADING IN SECURITIES
LITIGATION 
Three times since 2011 the Court has dealt with “substantive front-
loading” in the context of securities class actions under Rule 10b-5. By 
this I mean litigation at the certification stage that is not imposed by 
Rule 23 but by the substantive law of the claim asserted. Two of the 
opinions involve the same case: Halliburton I,128 decided in 2011, and 
Halliburton II,129 decided in 2014. Between them, in 2013, the Court 
decided Amgen.130 In each, the fact pattern is familiar: a publicly traded 
company (or its agent) makes a misrepresentation that inflates the price 
of its stock; plaintiffs buy the stock at the inflated price; a corrective 
126.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (U.S. 2011). 
127.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434. 
128.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011).  
129.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (U.S. 2014). 
130.  Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013). 
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announcement is made, and the price of the stock falls. Everyone agrees 
that a class of buyers or sellers of the stock will satisfy Rule 23(a). The 
question is whether common questions can predominate for certification 
of a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). 
To prevail on the merits in a private Rule 10b-5 case, plaintiffs 
must demonstrate various elements, which include material 
misrepresentation,131 scienter, and a connection between the 
misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a security. We focus here 
on three other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim: (1) reliance (the plaintiff 
must have relied on the misrepresentation); (2) materiality (the 
misrepresentation must have been about something a reasonable investor 
would have considered important); and (3) “loss causation.” The third, 
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, requires 
plaintiffs to show that their loss resulted from the misrepresentation and 
its correction, and not from some other (e.g., macro-economic) cause.132 
If each class member were required to demonstrate these three 
things individually, class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) would be 
impossible, because individual issues would predominate over common 
ones. The Court recognized this in 1988 in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.133 
There it endorsed the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which creates a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance.134 The presumption arises when the 
stock is traded on an efficient market and the material misstatement was 
made publicly.135 The idea is that efficient markets factor into the stock 
price the entire mix of public information – good and bad.136 As the 
Court later explained, the presumption attaches if (1) the misstatement 
was made publicly, (2) was material, (3) the securities market on which 
the security is traded is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff bought or sold 
during the relevant time frame.137 
Without Basic, few (if any) Rule 10b-5 damages classes could be 
certified.138 The representative bears the burden at the certification stage 
 131.  An omission of fact may also be actionable under Rule 10b-5, but for convenience we 
will assume a case based upon misrepresentation. 
 132.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012) (plaintiff “shall have the burden of proving that the act or 
omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”). 
133.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
134.  Id. at 250. 
135.  Id. at 237. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (U.S. 2014). 
138.  “Absent the fraud-on-the-market theory, the requirement that Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs 
establish reliance would ordinarily preclude certification of a class action seeking money damages 
because individual reliance issues would overwhelm questions common to the class.” Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (U.S. 2013). 
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of demonstrating that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance 
should attach.139 If she satisfies this burden, reliance is presumed for the 
entire class and presents no individual questions.140 The defendant is free 
to rebut the presumption, but this is a tough row to hoe. For example, the 
defendant might show that individual class members in fact did not rely 
on the misstatement. Such proof would be rare, and would probably only 
pick off a few class members at most. 
Through the years, the Fifth Circuit required that the representative 
show loss causation as a prerequisite to certification.141 In Halliburton I, 
because the representative did not do so, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
certification.142 The Supreme Court reversed unanimously and 
explained: “Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts 
necessary to establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-the-
market theory.”143 Loss causation simply has nothing to do with reliance. 
Thus, it is a “merits” issue to be proved at the adjudication (not the 
certification) stage.144 
In Amgen, the Court faced a tougher call: whether the 
representative, to invoke the presumption of reliance, must demonstrate 
materiality of the misstatement.145 Courts of appeals had disagreed on 
the question and inextricable sub-question of whether the defendant 
should be permitted to demonstrate – again, at the certification stage – 
that the misstatement was not material.146 Materiality presents a difficult 
139.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 225. 
140.  Id. at 225. 
141.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2181 (U.S. 2011). 
142.  Id. at 2181. 
143.  Id. at 2186. 
144.  It may be difficult to translate the holding in Amgen to other substantive areas. For 
example, in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013), a class of authors sued 
Google for copyright infringement for providing “snippets” of millions of copyrighted works. The 
defendant asserted “fair use” under the copyright law. The district judge certified the plaintiff class. 
The Second Circuit rejected the effort, however, and ruled that the holding was premature:  
On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that class certification was premature in 
the absence of a determination by the District Court of the merits of Google’s “fair use” 
defense. Accordingly, we vacate the June 11, 2012 order certifying the class and remand 
the cause to the District Court, for consideration of the fair use issues, without prejudice 
to any future motion for class certification. 
Id. at 132. 
145.  Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (U.S. 2013). 
 146.  Compare, e.g., Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. (In re Salomon Analyst 
Metromedia Litig.), 544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008) (representative must show materiality at 
certification stage and defendant may introduce evidence to rebut the showing) and Oscar Private 
Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (same), abrogated on 
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011), with the Ninth Circuit decision affirmed in Amgen, 133 
S. Ct. 1184.  
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issue because it, unlike loss causation, is relevant both for adjudication 
on the merits (it is an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim) and to invoke the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption for reliance (after all, no one would 
rely on an immaterial misstatement about the value of securities). 
In Amgen, the Court held that the representative is not required to 
present evidence of materiality at the certification stage.147 Materiality, 
the Court explained, will always be susceptible to aggregate proof (and 
is either met or not met for all class members).148 Accordingly, 
materiality can be decided en masse at the adjudication stage (trial or 
summary judgment).149 If the class fails to demonstrate materiality, 
every class member’s claim will be rejected on the merits.150 Because 
proof of materiality is irrelevant in ruling on certification, the Court 
reasoned, the defendant may not attempt to rebut materiality at that 
stage.151 
After remand in Halliburton I, the defendant argued that it should 
be permitted to oppose certification by attacking the applicability of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory and thus the presumption of reliance.152 
Specifically, it asserted that the misstatement had no “price impact” on 
the facts of the case.153 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, held that the 
defendant could not proffer the evidence and that the case should 
proceed to adjudication with the presumption of reliance intact.154 
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on that 
question and added the issue of whether Basic ought to be overruled.155 
Justice Scalia had raised that bombshell question during oral argument in 
Amgen.156 Halliburton argued that economic science had demonstrated 
that the Basic presumption was flawed.157 The Court rejected the 
argument and held that Halliburton had not met the heavy burden of 
overcoming stare decisis.158 
147.  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1188. 
148.  Id. at 1189. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at 1203-04. 
151.  In Amgen, the defendant sought to prove at certification that what it admitted was a 
public misstatement was not material because the market clearly understood it to be untrue, in part 
because of other public statements and documents. Id. 
152.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (U.S. 2011). 
153.  Id. at 2187. 
154.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013). 
155.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (U.S. 2014). 
156.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085). 
157.  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1198. 
158.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2411. 
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As with Shady Grove, it is worth pondering how a contrary 
conclusion would have changed the landscape. Just as the former saved 
Rule 23 from evisceration by state law, Halliburton II rejected nothing 
less than an existential threat to private securities class actions. 
Beyond this, Halliburton II clarified the discussion in Amgen of 
what issues may be litigated at the certification stage. As noted above, 
there are four requirements for invoking the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption: (1) the misstatement/omission was made publicly, (2) it 
was material, (3) the securities market is efficient, and (4) the plaintiff 
bought or sold the securities during the relevant time frame.159 The Court 
explained that three of the four requirements – publicity, materiality, and 
efficiency of the market –concern “price impact”; that is, whether the 
misrepresentation affected the market price of the security.160 While 
Amgen held that materiality is an issue to be litigated at the adjudication 
stage, the representative must demonstrate at certification that the other 
three are satisfied.161 Without that showing, the plaintiffs cannot invoke 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.162 
Because these issues are on the table for certification, the defendant 
must be permitted to demonstrate lack of “price impact” at that time.163 
Specifically, this means that Halliburton will be permitted present 
evidence that the misrepresentation did not affect the market price.164 
These securities cases represent significant victories for the plaintiffs’ 
bar. First, the Court rejected efforts to overrule Basic. Second, it rejected 
efforts to front-load litigation based upon substantive elements of Rule 
10b-5 claims. Of course, the Court permits the defendant to attack the 
application of the presumption of reliance, which will add to litigation at 
the certification stage (though probably in very few cases).165 Third, the 
Court made clear in Amgen that the representative’s burden is to 
159.  Id. at 2413. 
160.  Id. at 2414. 
161.  Id. at 2416. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. at 2414. 
164.  The argument is that the public market discounted the misrepresentation/omission in light 
of other statements. This would appear to come very close to Halliburton’s earlier argument that the 
misstatement/omission was not material. After Amgen and Halliburton II, Halliburton cannot 
introduce evidence of immateriality at the certification motion, but it can argue lack of “price 
impact.”  
 165.  In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the holding “may broaden the 
scope of discovery available at certification.” Because the evidence will be produced by the 
defendant, however, she concluded that the expansion of front-loading in Halliburton II should 
“impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.” Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2417.  
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demonstrate that the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met, and not that 
every question will be answered on the merits in favor of the class.166 
Cases in the first two Parts of this Article have dealt with 
defendants’ assertion that certification litigation should embrace more 
issues. We turn next to a more audacious assertion: that class 
certification may be avoided altogether. 
III. AVOIDANCE: THE ARBITRATION/CLASS “WAIVER” TRUMP CARD
The Supreme Court’s fulsome embrace of arbitration clauses is well
chronicled.167 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), passed in 1925, 
decreed an end to judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.168 At the time, arbitration clauses applied to contractual 
claims between business entities. In the past generation, arbitration 
clauses have found their way into innumerable contracts of adhesion and 
have expanded from contract claims to cover a wide variety of 
consumer, employment, tort, and federal statutory claims. The Court has 
been willing to uphold clauses in these new contexts, emphasizing the 
freedom of parties to contract on such matters.169 More recently, many 
adhesion contracts have added another provision: a “waiver” of 
aggregate litigation170 – that is, a clause that forbids plaintiffs from 
joining to assert their claims in arbitration. 
This combination sets up a collision course between the pro-
contract policy of the FAA, on the one hand, and basic access to justice, 
on the other. The clash is illustrated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.171 There, customers signed up for a cellphone plan with 
AT&T that offered a free phone.172 The problem was that AT&T then 
charged customers for sales tax on the phone ($30.22 per phone).173 The 
 166.  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (U.S. 2011) (emphasis in original) (“Rule 
23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those 
questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”). 
 167.  See, e.g., 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3569 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing case law and citing literature). 
 168.  Courts traditionally rejected arbitration clauses (and forum selection clauses, for that 
matter) on the theory that they constituted improper private efforts to “oust” courts of jurisdiction. 
See generally id. § 2569. 
 169.  State-law contract defenses may be invoked to avoid arbitration. The most important is 
unconscionability. 
 170.  Because the prohibition of aggregate assertion of claims is typically contained in a 
contract of adhesion, “waiver” – at least insofar as it implies voluntary relinquishment – is a 
euphemistic term.  
171.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011). 
172.  Id. at 1742. 
173.  Id. at 1744. 
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agreement provided for arbitration of disputes and forbade class 
arbitration.174 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs brought a federal class action 
based upon state consumer law.175 The provider moved to compel 
arbitration, which the district court denied.176 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.177 It relied upon Discover Bank v. Superior Court, in which the 
California Supreme Court held that waivers of the right to collective 
arbitration are unconscionable if included in adhesion contracts 
involving negative-value consumer fraud claims.178 The effect of the 
California holding was to permit the customers to demand class 
arbitration even though their contract with the retailer forbade it.179 
The Court reversed.180 The five-justice majority, led by Justice 
Scalia, held that the FAA preempts the state case law.181 The Court 
noted that Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration 
clauses, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”182 This “savings clause” permits 
invalidation of arbitration agreements on state-law grounds applicable to 
contracts generally (such as fraud or unconscionability),183 but not on 
grounds that apply only to arbitration clauses.184 There are two situations 
in which the FAA preempts state law: (1) when the state law prohibits 
outright the arbitration of a type of claim and (2) when a general contract 
defense is applied in a way that disfavors arbitration.185 Thus, state-law 
rules that “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. at 1744-45. 
177.  Id. at 1745. 
178.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1745. 
 179.  Interestingly, as noted, the representatives sought to bring class litigation, not arbitration. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (“In March of 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against 
AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.”). 
180.  Id. at 1753. 
181.  Id. at 1740. 
182.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
183.  See, e.g., Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Checking Account Overdraft 
Litig. MDL No. 2036), 685 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (provision that expenses of arbitration be 
borne by customer regardless of outcome is unconscionable as a matter of general contract law; 
clause was severable from arbitration provision, however, so arbitration would be ordered); Palmer 
v. Infosys Techs., Ltd. Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (arbitration agreement
unconscionable as a matter of general contract law; “[w]hile the Concepcion Court expressed 
concern about arbitration morphing into a set of formalized, class-based procedures, this arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable at an antecedent step.”). 
184.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
185.  Id. at 1747. 
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objectives”186 are preempted. 
According to the Court, the California law in Discover Bank was 
such a rule.187 One purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of 
arbitration clauses according to their terms.188 Another is to foster 
efficient, speedy dispute resolution.189 The Court concluded that 
California law obstructed the latter objective by (1) replacing bilateral 
arbitration with a slower, expensive, procedurally complicated method 
“more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”;190 (2) 
placing the arbitrator in the unaccustomed position of having to protect 
absentees’ interests; and (3) exposing the defendant to enormous 
potential liability based upon the outcome of a single case; this risk is 
exacerbated by the limited appellate review available in arbitration 
cases.191Concepcion had an immediate impact. Several courts held that 
the FAA preempted state consumer protection laws mandating class 
resolution.192 In Kilgore v. Keybank, National Assn.,193 a non-class case, 
the Ninth Circuit got the message (after being reversed in 
Concepcion).194 It held that the FAA preempts California law that 
forbids arbitration altogether (class or individual) in cases seeking public 
injunctive relief.195 The theory of the California precedent is that such 
private attorney general cases should be litigated in court and not 
arbitrated.196 Because the state case law was a blanket ban on arbitration, 
it interfered with the policy goals of the FAA and, under Concepcion, 
was preempted.197 
There are arguments against class treatment (in litigation or 
arbitration) in cases like Concepcion. One of the historic justifications of 
the class action is efficiency – it will substitute one case (albeit complex) 
for thousands of small ones. But negative-value claims such as those in 
186.  Id. at 1748. 
187.  Id. at 1756. 
188.  Id. at 1748. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. at 1751. 
191.  Id. at 1751-52. 
192.  See, e.g., Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (court did 
not have to reach issue of whether Florida law invalidated class action waiver; to the extent it 
would, it is preempted by FAA); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir, 2012) 
(Washington law); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (Florida law). 
193.  Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012). 
194.  Id. at 959, reh’g en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). 
195.  Id. at 960. 
196.  Id. at 958. 
197.  Id. at 959 
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Concepcion will not be asserted individually.198 As Judge Posner has 
said, only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.199 Because the thousands of 
small claims would never be filed, aggregation actually creates litigation 
that would never have been filed. Creating litigation usually is thought to 
be a bad thing. Moreover, promoting proceedings in these cases seems 
inconsistent with the maxim de minimis non curat lex. That precept 
teaches us that in this world, we occasionally have to take our lumps for 
$30. And, of course, aggregation of claims exposes a defendant to 
potentially catastrophic liability on the basis of one roll of the dice. 
But there are profound policies in the other direction. Litigation and 
arbitration are methods of law enforcement. If no one will file a claim, 
the law will not be enforced. Stated another way, enforcing a class action 
“waiver” can be exculpatory: it gives the defendant a pass, at least as to 
negative-value claims that de facto will not be enforced individually. So 
viewed, Concepcion thwarts the power of the states to decide how to 
enforce their consumer protection (and other) laws. It forbids a state 
from permitting private vindication of its laws in lieu of (or in addition 
to) administrative or criminal enforcement. 
Of course, state policy must bow to valid applicable federal law. 
According to Concepcion, a state “cannot require a procedure that is 
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons.”200 This is an important phrase. It suggests that “waivers” of 
class arbitration will be upheld (when preempted by the FAA) even if it 
is clear that no one in the putative class will bring an individual claim. 
This implication is consistent with the Court’s relentless theme that 
agreements are to be enforced by their terms.201 On the facts, the 
majority in Concepcion concluded that claims would be vindicated in 
individual arbitration.202 The agreement in the case was seen as 
 198.  Notice the similarity between the class action arbitration waiver in Concepcion and the 
New York statute in Shady Grove. Both the contract in Concepcion and the statute in Shady Grove 
rule out aggregation in precisely the circumstance – the small claim case – when we fear that 
individual claims will not be pursued. 
199.  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).  
200.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (U.S. 2011). 
201.  See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669-673 (U.S. 2012) 
(because Credit Repair Organizations Act was silent regarding arbitration, agreement to arbitrate 
claims is enforceable); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (U.S. 2010) 
(when contract was silent regarding permissibility of class arbitration, arbitrator may not infer 
consent to aggregation). The Court has been very active in arbitration in recent years, and has 
consistently emphasized the importance of enforcing the agreement as written. See WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 167, § 3569. See also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (FAA requires enforcement of arbitration 
provisions “in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). 
202.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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consumer-friendly.203 The clause required arbitration in the customer’s 
home county, required AT&T to pay all costs, and, if the arbitration 
award was higher than the defendant’s offer, the customer would recover 
$7,500 and double attorney’s fees.204 Thus, the Court did not see the 
provision as preventing vindication of the consumers’ claims. 
Consumer advocates question whether the terms of the AT&T 
agreement in Concepcion really promoted individual vindication of 
claims.205 In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,206 the Eleventh Circuit 
addressed the same contract involved in Concepcion. In Cruz, though, 
unlike in Concepcion, plaintiffs’ lawyers submitted affidavits from 
attorneys averring that they would not represent consumers on an 
individual basis in such cases.207 They also presented evidence that only 
an infinitesimal percentage of consumers actually pursued claims under 
the arbitration provision – notwithstanding the pro-consumer 
provisions.208 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that it “need not 
reach the question of whether Concepcion leaves open the possibility 
that in some cases, an arbitration agreement may be invalidated on 
public policy grounds where it effectively prevents the claimant from 
vindicating her statutory cause of action.”209 The argument, the court 
said, was foreclosed by Concepcion itself, which had upheld the very 
same class action waiver provision.210 
Lower courts appeared to read Concepcion broadly – to hold that 
the FAA’s preemptive power is not readily tempered by the need to 
facilitate civil enforcement of the law.211 In the face of this trend, 
 203.  The district court concluded that the class members would be better off pursuing that 
remedy than aggregate resolution. 
204.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 205.  Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What 
Does the Future Hold After Concepcion? 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345 (2013), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=jbtl. 
206.  Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). 
207.  Id. at 1214. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. at 1215. 
210.  Id. The contract in Concepcion and Cruz contained a “blow up” provision under which 
invalidity of any part of the arbitration provision would result in voiding arbitration altogether. The 
Eleventh Circuit discussed this non-severability clause in Cruz. If state law invalidated the waiver of 
class arbitration, the court noted, the entire arbitration agreement would be thwarted, and the case 
could proceed only in the courts. Id. This result would thoroughly frustrate the policy of the FAA 
and constituted another reason to hold the state law preempted. For some reason, neither the Ninth 
Circuit nor the Supreme Court in Concepcion discussed the blow up provision. The Ninth Circuit 
later adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Cruz. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 
(9th Cir. 2012).  
 211.  See, eg., Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011); Cruz, 648 F.3d 1205; 
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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however, the Second Circuit went the other way in American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.212 There, a class of restaurant owners 
sued American Express, alleging that the credit card company violated 
federal antitrust laws by using monopoly power to force them to accept 
credit cards at higher interest rates than those charged by competitors.213 
The agreements required arbitration and forbade aggregation.214 Though 
the claims were not de minimus, plaintiffs argued that they were 
negative-value claims.215 Specifically, the cost of retaining expert 
witnesses on the complex economic issues in such cases would be 
prohibitive.216 Only if they could litigate en masse would it be feasible to 
retain experts and prove the case.217The Second Circuit struck the class 
action “waiver” on policy grounds.218 It distinguished Concepcion 
because the plaintiffs had shown that pursuit of individual claims was 
not feasible.219 The court concluded that the “federal substantive law of 
arbitrability” permits a court to compel class arbitration when it finds 
that aggregate resolution is the “only economically feasible means” for 
the plaintiff to pursue its federal-law claim.220 Stated another way, 
“effective vindication” of the antitrust laws required invalidation of the 
class waiver.221 
The Court reversed, five to three,222 with Justice Scalia again 
writing for the majority. Here, the Court could not say, as it could in 
Concepcion, that provisions in the arbitration clause facilitated 
individual vindication of claims.223 The Court was willing to accept that 
 212.  Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express 
Merchs. Litig.), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013). The Supreme Court had earlier remanded the case to the Second 
Circuit for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen. While the case was pending at the Second 
Circuit on remand, the Court decided Concepcion. 
213.  Italian Colors, 667 F.3d at 207. 
214.  Id. at 206. 
215.  Id. at 210.  
216.  The class asserted that American Express used its monopoly power in the credit card 
market to force merchants to pay more than they would for competing cards. They argued that the 
agreement constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308. 
217.  Italian Colors, 667 F.3d at 212. 
218.  Id. at 219.  
219.  Id. at 214.  
220.  Id. at 213-14. The fact that Italian Colors involved federal claims while Concepcion 
involved state-law claims appeared to be of no significance to the Second Circuit or to the Supreme 
Court.  
221.  Id. at 217.  
222.  Justice Sotomayor recused. 
223.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (U.S. 2013). 
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individual litigation would be infeasible economically.224 Still, 
Concepcion governed.225 The majority explained that nothing in the 
FAA, the antitrust laws, or Rule 23 evinces an intention to prohibit 
parties from foregoing their right to assert class claims.226 
More importantly, the Court discussed the “effective vindication” 
argument embraced by the Second Circuit.227 It recognized that “public 
policy” can invalidate agreements that operate “as a prospective waiver 
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”228 But nothing in the 
present agreement impeded the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue statutory 
remedies.229 The substantive damages claim asserted under the Sherman 
Act was created 48 years before promulgation of the original Rule 23 
made it possible to aggregate such claims.230 The fact that it is not worth 
the expense of proving the claim “does not constitute the elimination of 
the right to pursue that remedy.”231 In short, “the antitrust laws do not 
guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every 
claim.”232 Bluntly, then, the majority concluded that a prohibitively 
expensive path to vindicate one’s rights is not equivalent to the 
elimination of those rights.233 
The Court’s FAA cases elevate contract over various substantive 
policies: the plaintiffs agreed (1) to arbitrate instead of litigate and (2) to 
go it alone. Unless Congress provides that aggregate litigation is 
necessary for vindication of particular claims, the parties will be bound 
by their contract.234 And because of the supremacy of federal law, state 
law will not be permitted to require group vindication.235 
Of course, parties are free to contract to arbitrate en masse. 
Presumably, such agreements are rare, and many contracts will not 
address the issue expressly. In those cases, Oxford Health gives some 
solace to plaintiffs.236 There, the arbitrator interpreted the arbitration 
224.  Id. at 2313. 
225.  Id. at 2309. 
226.  Indeed, the Court said, if Rule 23 were interpreted to invalidate private arbitration 
agreements and waivers, it would likely violate the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 2309-10. 
227.  Id. at 2310-11. 
 228.  Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 637 n.19 (1985)). 
229.  Id. at 2311. 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. at 2306. 
233.  Id. at 2311. 
234.  Id. at 2309. 
235.  Id. at 2320. 
236.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (U.S. 2013). 
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clause to manifest an agreement to class treatment.237 Applying the 
FAA’s limited provision for judicial review of arbitration decisions, the 
Court upheld the order.238 Oxford Health is consistent with the pro-
contract policy of the Court’s other decisions.239 
Though Oxford Health opens the door for class proceedings, it is 
not much of an opening. After all, corporations can simply insert class 
“waivers” into their arbitration provisions. The current state of affairs 
under Concepcion and Italian Colors is not encouraging for private 
enforcement of law through the class mechanism. This problem, 
however, is not the result of class action jurisprudence. It is a result of 
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, which uncritically has applied that Act 
to contracts and claims not envisioned when it was passed. There is, 
however, no indication that the Court is willing to retreat from its 
position. Efforts for legislative change have failed. Though the trend 
threatens aggregate assertion of claims, obviously, not all claims will be 
subject to contractual limitation. When class litigation proceeds, it is 
important to determine when the representative’s acts can bind class 
members. We address aspects of that question next. 
IV. STATUS OF CLASS MEMBERS IN AN UNCERTIFIED CLASS
Smith v. Bayer Corp.,240 decided in 2011, and Standard Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Knowles,241 decided in 2013, concern the fundamental principle 
that one who has not been accorded a “day in court” cannot be bound by 
a judgment. Smith involved overlapping classes: Case 1 was in federal 
court under diversity jurisdiction,242 and Case 2 was in state court.243 In 
each, essentially the same class (with different representatives) sued 
Bayer under West Virginia law for an allegedly defective product.244 The 
federal court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because common 
 237.  The parties agreed to submit any “civil action” to arbitration. Because class actions are 
civil actions, the arbitrator concluded, the parties intended to permit class proceedings. Id. at 2067. 
 238.  The arbitrator did not “exceed [his] powers” under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), so a court is 
powerless to vacate the order. As the Court explained in Oxford Health, the question under that 
provision is “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he 
got its meaning right or wrong.” Id. at 2071. 
 239.  The case is to be distinguished from Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662, 684 (2010). There, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by ordering class arbitration in light 
of the parties’ stipulation that they did not agree on the issue of class proceedings. 
240.  Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (U.S. 2011). 
241.  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013). 
242.  Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2373. 
243.  Id. 
244.  Id. 
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questions would not predominate under applicable state law.245 The 
federal court then issued an anti-suit injunction against prosecution of 
the state class action.246 It invoked the “re-litigation exception” to the 
Anti-Injunction Statute, which permits an injunction against state 
proceedings if necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court’s 
judgments.247 The Eighth Circuit248 held that the finding on whether 
common questions predominated under Rule 23(b)(3) was entitled to 
issue preclusion and thus that the injunction was justified.249 
The Court reversed unanimously.250 First, Case 1 and Case 2 did 
not present the same issue.251 Though West Virginia has adopted Rule 
23, it interprets the provision differently from federal courts.252 Thus a 
finding of predominance of common questions under one did not 
address the same issue as that raised under the other.253 Second, the 
representative in Case 2 could not be bound by the judgment in Case 
1.254 True, he was a class member in Case 1, but he was not the 
representative, and thus, he was not a party.255 And because class 
certification was denied, he could not be bound by the result in Case 1—
he had not had his day in court.256 
Knowles does something similar. Here, the representative filed a 
class action in state court asserting a state-law claim for alleged breach 
of homeowners’ insurance policies.257 In the complaint and in an 
attached affidavit, he expressly limited the amount the class would seek 
to under $5,000,000.258 The obvious intent was to defeat removal under 
245.  Id. at 2380. 
246.  Id. at 2374. 
247.  28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012); Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2374. 
248.  The case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court in West Virginia, 
which is in the Fourth Circuit. It was transferred to the District of Minnesota under the MDL statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). That is why the appeal went to the Eighth Circuit. 
249.  Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2374. 
250.  Id. at 2372. 
251.  Id. at 2378. 
252.  Id. at 2377. 
253.  The case is reminiscent of Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988), in 
which differences between the federal and state standards for forum non conveniens rendered issue 
preclusion inapplicable. 
254.  Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2376.  
255.  Id. at 2380. 
256.  Id.  
257.  He claimed that the insurance company, in making loss payments to homeowners for hail 
damage, had unlawfully failed to include a general contractor’s fee. The complaint alleged that there 
were “hundreds, and possibly thousands” of similarly situated policyholders in Arkansas. Standard 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1347 (U.S. 2013). 
 258.  The writ of certiorari and briefs in the case spoke of the representative’s “stipulation” to 
limit the amount sought by the class. The complaint alleged that the representative and class 
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CAFA, which requires aggregated class claims in excess of 
$5,000,000.259 
The defendant removed to federal court under CAFA and showed 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims in fact totaled slightly 
more than $5,000,000.260 The burden then shifted to the representative to 
show to a legal certainty that the claims did not exceed $5,000,000.261 
The district court ordered remand, holding that the statement in the 
complaint – eschewing damages of more than $5,000,000 – was 
effective.262 The Eighth Circuit declined interlocutory review, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.263 
The Court vacated the district court’s ruling and held that the case 
invoked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.264 It recognized that a 
plaintiff can defeat removal by stipulating that she will not accept an 
amount that would satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy 
requirement.265 But such a stipulation must be binding on the plaintiff.266 
In Knowles, the class representative had no authority to bind the class 
members to the stipulation because the court had not certified a class.267 
Accordingly, the representative was not in a position to bind the 
absentee putative class members.268 The Court explained: 
[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind 
members of the proposed class before the class is certified. . . . Be-
cause his precertification stipulation does not bind anyone but himself, 
“stipulate they will seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars.” In an 
attached affidavit, the representative said that he “will not at any time . . . seek damages for the 
class . . . in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.” Id.  
 259.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). To keep the class claims below $5,000,000, the 
representative sought only two years’ worth of damages on behalf of the class members (of a total 
of five years that would be permitted under the statute of limitations). Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 
1347. 
260.  Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348. 
261.  Id. 
262.  The court relied upon Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009), which, while 
not addressing the “legal certainty” standard imposed in Knowles, held that a good faith stipulation 
limiting plaintiff’s recovery can defeat federal jurisdiction. 
 263.  Courts had disagreed on whether a representative’s limitation of damages could defeat 
removal under CAFA. Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348. Of the thirteen class action cases reviewed 
in this Article, only Knowles and Mississippi ex rel. Hood, discussed in Part V below, involved 
CAFA. 
264.  Id. at 1350. 
265.  Id. 
266.  Id. 
267.  The situation is different with individual litigation. A plaintiff suing for himself may, for 
example, limit his recovery to $75,000 or less and thus avoid removal on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction. Id.  
268.  Id. at 1349. 
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Knowles has not reduced the value of the putative class members’ 
claims. . . . The Federal District Court, therefore, wrongly concluded 
that Knowles’ precertification stipulation could overcome its finding 
that the CAFA jurisdictional threshold had been met.269 
Knowles may be seen to promote plaintiff class practice by 
forbidding a representative from bargaining away class members’ rights 
to sue for the maximum recovery possible. On the other hand, Knowles 
permits defendants to remove cases to federal court under CAFA 
(assuming minimal diversity) by showing that the aggregate amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 
Smith is far more important for plaintiffs because it allows serial re-
litigation of class certification. For instance, suppose Rep-1 seeks to 
represent Class. The court denies certification, however, because, let’s 
say, common questions do not predominate. Smith permits Rep-2 to step 
up to represent the same class for the same claim. Because class 
certification was denied in Rep-1’s case, no class member is bound by 
the unsuccessful effort. In theory, the defendant would have to defeat 
any number of serial certification efforts – to face what Professor Redish 
calls “death by a thousand cuts.”270 
The pro-plaintiff bent of Smith is not the result of developments 
under Rule 23. It is born of the day-in-court principle, which is 
ultimately rooted in due process. Smith and Knowles are nice 
complements to Taylor v. Sturgell,271 in which the Court rejected virtual 
representation and described the limited circumstances in which a 
nonparty may be precluded by a judgment.272 
Smith points out that even states that adopt the Federal Rules are 
not required to adopt the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23.273 It is not 
clear, for example, that state courts will follow Wal-Mart in applying the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) or the federal view on 
269.  Id. 
 270.  Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The 
Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1659 (2014). To avoid this pro-plaintiff result, the authors suggest a rule estopping class counsel 
from recruiting serial representatives. Professor Clermont has argued that class members should be 
estopped from re-litigating class certification by analogy to the “jurisdiction to determine no 
jurisdiction” doctrine. Kevin M. Clermont, Class Certification’s Preclusive Effects, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 203, 208 (2011). I have argued that class members can be bound by an adverse ruling on class 
certification, so long as the court found the representative in the first case to be adequate. Richard 
D. Freer, Preclusion and the Denial of Class Certification: Avoiding the “Death by a Thousand 
Cuts,” 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 85 (2014). 
271.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
272.  Id. at 896. 
273.  Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 n.12 (U.S. 2011). 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/2
2015] CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE 753 
procedural front-loading of certification.274 For these and other 
reasons,275 class plaintiffs may prefer to litigate in state court. They face 
increased obstacles, however, from expansions of federal jurisdiction. 
The clearest example, of course, is CAFA, which allows a single 
defendant to remove state-court class actions to federal court based upon 
minimal diversity of citizenship and an aggregate amount in controversy 
of $5,000,000.276 Such powerful magnets make it more difficult for 
state-court plaintiffs to stay in state court. As we see now, however, the 
Court has given at least some aspects of these grants a limited 
interpretation. 
V. LIMITED INTERPRETATIONS OF CAFA AND SLUSA 
The two remaining cases feature interpretations, respectively, of 
CAFA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). 
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. was a parens patriae 
action brought by Mississippi against manufacturers of liquid crystal 
displays. The suit, filed in state court, alleged violations of state law and 
sought restitution on behalf of itself and its citizens.277 The defendants 
removed under the “mass action” provision of CAFA.278 This permits 
federal jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity not only of class 
actions but of suits (brought in states that do not recognize the class 
action, such as Mississippi) for monetary relief brought by 100 or more 
persons.279 The Court held that Mississippi was the only plaintiff and 
rejected the argument that those on whose behalf the state sued should 
be considered.280 This interpretation of CAFA permits states or their 
officers to sue on behalf of citizens, to avoid the capacious jurisdiction 
of CAFA, and remain in state court.281 
Chadbourne & Parke282 involved consolidated state-court class 
 274.  For an example of this interpretation, see Jesse Wenger, The Applicability of State Appeal 
Bond Caps in Suits Brought in Federal Courts Pursuant to Diversity Jurisdiction, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 979, 993 (2014). 
 275.  For example, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), which permits appellate review of certification 
decisions, effective in the federal system since 1998, has not been replicated in all state courts. 
Plaintiffs might fear that Rule 23(f) gives a defendant a chance to second-guess class certification 
orders that is not available in state courts. 
276.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(D)(6) (2012). 
277.  Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 740 (U.S. 2014). 
278.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11). 
279.  Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 741. 
280.  Id. at 739. 
281.  Id. at 744. 
282.  Chadbourne & Parke LLC v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014). 
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actions that alleged violations of state law through defendants’ Ponzi 
scheme in sale of certificates of deposit.283 SLUSA prohibits securities 
class actions based upon state law when the alleged misrepresentation or 
omission concerns a “covered security.”284 The certificates of deposit at 
issue in the case were not “covered,” but the alleged fraud consisted of 
misrepresentations that they were backed by covered securities.285 The 
Court held that SLUSA applies only when the actual trading is in 
covered securities.286 Because the alleged misrepresentation did not 
involve such investments, SLUSA did not apply, and the case was 
permitted to proceed in state court.287 
The holdings in these cases are jurisdictional and will not affect 
class practice per se. In each, though, the Court’s narrow interpretations 
uphold the plaintiff’s choice of state-court forum. 
CONCLUSION 
To be sure, there is good news for plaintiffs in this group of thirteen 
cases. The continued viability of Federal Rule 23 against state 
encroachment was assured in Shady Grove. The Court turned back 
attempted inroads on damages class actions for violations of Rule 10b-5 
in two ways: first, by retaining the presumption of reliance in fraud on 
the market cases in Amgen and, second, by rejecting efforts to require 
proof of loss causation and materiality at certification in Halliburton I 
and Amgen. In addition, efforts to bind class members in the absence of 
certification were rebuffed in Smith and Knowles. Finally, narrow 
interpretations of jurisdictional provisions in Mississippi ex rel. Hood 
and Chadbourne & Parke ensure a state-court forum for plaintiffs in 
certain instances. 
Obviously, one should not minimize the importance of the 
continued viability of Rule 23. Even so, the plaintiff-side victories are 
narrow. They are rooted in substantive securities law and obvious 
notions of the day-in-court principle. The defendant-side victories are 
more profound because they concern Rule 23 itself, and thus affect 
federal class actions generally. Under Wal-Mart, commonality under 
Rule 23(a)(2) is a higher hurdle in every federal class action.288 The 
focus is undeniably less on raising common questions than on generating 
283.  Id. at 1062. 
284.  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2012). 
285.  Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. at 1062. 
286.  Id. at 1071-72. 
287.  Id. at 1062. 
288.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (U.S. 2011). 
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answers on a class-wide basis. Moreover, money (whether labeled 
damages or equitable) can be recovered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class only in 
the Allison-type case in which it flows automatically from the 
injunctive/declaratory relief and is essentially liquidated. The “equitable 
relief” and “predominance” arguments for justifying recovery of money 
in a Rule 23(b)(2) class are no longer viable. Beyond this, the Court has 
expanded the scope of litigation to be undertaken at the certification 
stage. Rule 23 does not set forth a pleading standard.289 The 
representative must offer “convincing proof” that the requirements are 
satisfied. This will focus, inter alia, on whether merits issues (such as 
injury and damages) can be proved at trial en masse. Whether they can 
be shown en masse will usually entail a battle of experts, and Wal-Mart 
strongly suggests that expert evidence considered at certification must 
pass muster under Daubert. This, of course, increases the cost of 
certification litigation. And it is now clear that courts must not limit 
litigation of certification issues merely because they overlap with 
determinations on the merits.290 Moreover, the court must permit the 
defendant to present evidence rebutting plaintiffs’ claims for 
certification and, in Rule 10-5 cases, rebutting application of the fraud-
on-the-market theory.291 
The most profound development, however, comes from 
Concepcion and Italian Colors. Concepcion emphatically restates that 
arbitration is a matter of contract, including the adhesion contract.292 
State law mandating class arbitration in the face of a contract to the 
contrary is preempted. Combining such provisions with class “waivers” 
creates the perfect storm for plaintiff classes, at least when the expense 
of litigation outweighs the expected individual recovery. The present 
state in this regard is the result of the Court’s broad application of the 
FAA and not of class action jurisprudence. In the clash between 
enforcing contracts as written and ensuring private enforcement of the 
law, the Court has sided with the former. As a result, for many disputes, 
the question will not be whether the prerequisites of class certification 
can be satisfied. It will be whether Rule 23 has any role to play at all. 
289.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
290.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
291.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414-15 (U.S. 2014). 
292.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (U.S. 2011). 
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